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Ian Nguyen-Do's avatar

Very good summary 👌

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Flavertex's avatar

It is indeed a difficult mystery to ponder. I've played with the idea of "atemporal free will" to explain this, that perhaps our temporal freedom of the will is just a more limited and sequential representation of a higher free will whose choice, in the singular, is the sum of our entire response to life, the world, and God. This view seems to reconcile how our will could be free while at the same time being known by God in it's entirety, but it raises the question of "well, I'm not clearly and confidently conscious of having made any kind of atemporal choice, and indeed that would render my temporal experience of my life as just a kind of 'playing the tape' on the decision I've already made. And additionally, since making an atemporal choice also requires atemporal knowledge of my entire life, it would necessitate an unconscious part of myself which knows what will happen over the course of my life." Which is...a lot to propose without being able to demonstrate in any way to another person, even if you've had experiences you would call "prescient." Which I have, but there's nothing to come of claiming that without having to prove I'm not deluded, which is an argument I cannot in my own defend on account of a) there's no way to conclusively demonstrate it and b) if I am deluded, then perhaps my reason itself is deluded and I cannot effectively argue either for or against it. Anyway, that opens into a whole big can of worms.

Another option would be "many-worlds omniscience," in which God knows not only one particular life that you could live, but every possible life you could live based off of every possible choice you could make. Your freedom would reside in "collapsing the wave function" of which world would gets actualized, but there is no theoretical way that you could use your freedom to "surprise" God by making a choice he wouldn't have forseen and taken measures to respond in turn to. The obvious rebuttal to this is that it seems to ignore the possibility that omniscience could be argued to include not just knowledge of the field of possible choices, but of which actual choice you will make. To qualify "omniscience" as either necessarily including or omitting knowledge of actual choice is to pit human freedom and God's knowledge in a kind of stalemate, in which any amount of human freedom limits God's knowledge, and the fullness of God's knowledge limits human freedom. Another wormy end.

Ultimately, I'm content for it to be a mystery. The most I'll argue on the matter of predestination is that if any formulation of it's mechanism creates a situation where a person cannot effectively repent and turn to God, essentially rendering the efforts of said "doomed soul" to pursue salvation pointless, with the attitude that "they may as well throw in the towel and live a hedonistic lifestyle anyways," then I've got a problem with it. Luckily, there are positions which do not necessitate that.

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