Whelton book review: Audi alteram partem - Part 8

Contra Whelton on Nicaea I (325 AD)

Councils… are the mind of the Church in action, the sensus ecclesiae taking form and shape in the mould of dogmatic definition and authoritative decrees… Ecumenical Councils are those to which the bishops, and others entitled to vote, are convoked from the whole world (oikoumene) under the presidency of the pope or his legates, and the decrees of which, having received papal confirmation, bind all Christians. — Joseph Wilhelm, “General Councils” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (1908)

[If you haven’t already, we recommend that you read the Introduction to this series.]

True to form, Whelton’s second chapter (“The Seven Ecumenical Councils”) compensates for its brevity with a flurry of assertions. This essay examines his treatment of the First Council of Nicaea in 325 AD.

Whelton makes two claims against Catholicism from this council: that Canon 6 refutes the Pope’s universal jurisdiction, and that Emperor Constantine summoned the council alone. The first claim is false. The second is false or uncertain, and we will explain an important distinction concerning papal cooperation in councils to show that it doesn’t much matter who summoned the council.

Whelton on Canon 6

Of all the artifacts from the First Ecumenical Council, only the Creed and Canons have survived. The letters of convocation and official Acts have been lost to history. Whelton claims that one of the canons—the infamous Canon 6—supports the idea that the Church in Rome had "a primacy of honour with a limited geographical jurisdiction."

Here is the relevant part of the canon on which he bases his claim:

Let the ancient customs in Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis prevail, that the Bishop of Alexandria have jurisdiction in all these, since this (τοῦτο) is also customary for the Bishop of Rome also. Likewise in Antioch and the other provinces, let the Churches retain their privileges.¹

This canon was written to address a dispute over authority. The Bishop of Alexandria had tried to depose bishops aligned with a schismatic named Meletius of Lycopolis. A controversy arose when these bishops challenged the Bishop of Alexandria’s right to depose them, demanding that he provide some basis for his authority.

The Nicene Fathers addressed this dispute and upheld the Alexandrian See as holding a supra-metropolitan (later called Patriarchate) role over metropolitans and bishops in a given region. They provided two main reasons for their decision, as outlined in the canon itself: firstly, Alexandrian authority over the relevant areas was already ancient custom; secondly, "this [was] customary for the Bishop of Rome also."

Whelton thinks that the second reason implies that Rome, contrary to Catholic claims, never had unlimited jurisdiction. The crucial question is this: when the canon says that this (τοῦτο) was customary for Rome also, to what does this refer?

There are two interpretations to consider. The first has been more popular among historical authors, including the ancient author Rufinus, on whom Whelton relies. However, even though this is Whelton’s preferred interpretation, we will see that it doesn’t support his inference concerning the Bishop of Rome.

The other interpretation, if true, contradicts Whelton and offers compelling evidence of early papal supremacy. This interpretation has merit, in spite of its being less popular in history.  Notable figures, such as St. Robert Bellarmine and Archbishop John F. Loughlin, have defended it.²

Let’s begin with the first interpretation, which is that this (τοῦτο) refers

to patriarchates in general and [expounds] the sentence as follows: “Let Alexandria have jurisdiction over these provinces, because the Roman Bishop has also a Patriarchate.”³

Even on this interpretation, the purpose of the Canon is clearly to validate jurisdiction, not circumscribe it. Moreover, the Canon appeals to Rome’s being a patriarch as a norm by which to validate the jurisdictions of Alexandria and Antioch. This hardly supports the idea that the Sees were on a par when it came to jurisdictional matters.

Most importantly, however, it cannot support Whelton’s inference to deny universal jurisdiction to the Bishop of Rome. The Bishop of Rome had delimited jurisdiction as patriarch, because that’s what it meant to be a patriarch, namely, to be responsible for bishops and metropolitans in certain geographical areas and not others. That’s why the Pope was Patriarch of the West. But it doesn’t follow that the Bishop of Rome has limited jurisdiction in all respects.

As apostolic successor of Saint Peter, the Pope holds authority in multiple capacities, such as:⁴

1. Bishop of Rome

2. Metropolitan of the Roman province

3. Primate of All Italy

4. Patriarch (supra-metropolitan) of the West

5. Head or Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church

Whelton wrongly assumes that because the Pope has a particular jurisdiction in one capacity, he cannot have universal jurisdiction in any other capacity. But that doesn’t follow at all, and is mere question-begging. Canon 6, on Whelton’s interpretation, only addresses the Pope in his capacity as Patriarch of the West; it does not address any other of his roles or capacities.⁵

Whelton is therefore wrong to suggest that Canon 6 has any bearing against the Vatican I view of papal supremacy or supreme jurisdiction.⁶

So much for the first interpretation. What of the second? Loughlin writes:

According to Bellarmine and others, τοῦτο refers to the Patriarchate of Alexandria, and is to be expounded thus: “Let the Bishop of Alexandria continue to govern these provinces, because this is also the Roman Pontiff’s custom; that is, because the Roman Pontiff, prior to any synodical enactment, has repeatedly recognized the Alexandrian Bishop’s authority over this tract of country.”⁷

In this interpretation, Alexandrian authority is upheld because it was the custom of the Bishop of Rome to recognize it; the custom of Rome was a reason to keep three provinces under Alexandrian authority.

Loughlin marshals five powerful arguments to support this interpretation: from the grammatical structure of the Greek, from the logical sequence of the canon, from Catholic analogy, from the process of formation of the Byzantine Patriarchate, and from the authority of the ancients. He also argues against Rufinus’s Latin interpretation of the Greek, which Whelton takes for granted. Each argument is compelling in its own right and collectively they make a strong case. Although it is outside the scope of this essay to summarize them, I commend them to every reader for further study.

The upshot of all this is that we have two interpretations of Canon 6: one lends no support for Whelton’s inference against papal supremacy, and the other flatly contradicts it.

Whelton on who called the Nicene Council

Whelton criticizes certain “Roman Catholic books” for claiming

that the Emperor Constantine only summoned the council with the consent of Pope Sylvester. As Catholic historian Leo Donald Davis, S. J., points out in his book, The Seven Ecumenical Councils, this was a legend that surfaced in the seventh and eighth centuries; it was Constantine alone who summoned the council. [emphasis mine]

Whelton does not address the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople III in 680–681), which stated in its official Acts that the emperor convoked the first Council of Nicaea with Pope Sylvester. Furthermore, when we look at what Fr. Davis actually says, we find that Whelton has misrepresented him:

Only in the seventh and eighth centuries did the legend arise that Sylvester, bishop of Rome, was responsible, although there may have been extensive discussions between the emperor and the principal bishops over the matter.⁸ [emphasis mine]

Davis does not say that it was Constantine alone who summoned the council. He uses the word “legend,” but the second half of the sentence indicates the possibility that the legend, as can happen, is true—that is, that Sylvester played a role in convoking the council.

In any case, Davis is wrong when he says that the claim about Pope Sylvester’s involvement arose in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Liber Pontificalis, dated to the sixth century but was based on material from earlier times, states that the Council was convened at the consent of Pope Sylvester.⁹

Lastly, when we shift our focus from who convoked the council to who presided over it, Dom John Chapman, OSB, notes that the available evidence makes it "much more likely that Constantine nominated [the Pope’s official legate] Hosius as president."¹⁰ Whelton, of course, does not address this at all.

Papal Cooperation in Councils: de facto or de jure?

On this matter of who did or did not call upon the bishops to meet, Whelton confuses de facto and de jure.¹¹ As Lumen Gentium states: 

A council is never ecumenical unless it is confirmed or at least accepted as such by the successor of Peter; and it is prerogative of the Roman Pontiff to convoke these councils, to preside over them and to confirm them.¹² [emphasis mine]

While de facto pertains to what might exist in practice, de jure pertains to what is formally established by privilege or right. A citizen may take it upon himself to direct traffic (de facto), but only the police have the prerogative to do so (de jure), regardless of whether people choose to comply or not.

Similarly, the Pope's prerogative to convene a Council is de jure, not de facto. An emperor can summon bishops to a council through imperial decree. But the empire is not the Church, and therefore such a call by itself, even if successful, would have no doctrinal or ecclesiastical binding without sanction (ex post facto or otherwise) by the Pope:

The juridical convocation of a council implies something more than an invitation addressed to all the bishops of the world to meet in council, viz.: the act by which in law the bishops are bound to take part in the council, and the council itself is constituted a legitimate tribunal for dealing with Church affairs.¹³

Fr. Thomas Crean, O.P., illustrates the difference between de facto and de jure in the early conciliar convocations, when there were numerous practical reasons why the Emperor played a larger role:

[The Emperor’s] convocation was therefore material rather than formal; that is, he brought the bishops together so that they might teach the true faith, but did not invest them either as individuals or as a body with magisterial rights…

The popes themselves during the early councils neither contest the imperial right of convocation nor teach it. They adapt themselves to circumstances, understanding that various things made it almost inevitable that the emperors would act as having the right to summon councils, at least of Eastern bishops: Roman law forbade any large assembly to take place without imperial permission; the costs of the council would have to be defrayed by public expense; until the acquisition of the papal states, the pope was de facto an imperial subject. All these things made it reasonable that the pope at this period should request, rather than command, the emperor to summon a council.¹⁴

Furthermore, Dom Chapman observed that Emperor Constantine

granted the bishops the use of the imperial post carriages, and paid their expenses, thus making the hardships of the long journeys tolerable.¹⁵

This latter point is important. The imperial convocation of councils was necessary

for ensuring the safety, under the circumstances of the times, and for facilitating the journeys of the bishops, who made use of the imperial posts… [This] intervention was unavoidable on account of the territorial power of the emperors and of their general influence.¹⁶

Whelton puts great emphasis on whether the emperor alone summoned the council. However, in reality, this detail holds little importance because the emperor can only de facto convene a council. Anyone may de facto call a council, but only one person can do so de jure—the Pope.

Conclusion

Whelton’s two main assertions about the first council are either false or irrelevant. We will address his remarks on the other councils, and including his claims about councils in general, in future parts.

1. The Greek: Τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθη κρατείτω· τὰ μὲν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ Λιβύῃ, καὶ Πενταπόλει, ὥστε τὸν Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπίσκοπον πάντων τούτων ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπισκόπῳ τοῦτο σύνηθές ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπαρχίαις αἱ πρεσβεῖαι σωζέσθωσαν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις.

2. J.F. Loughlin, D.D., “The Sixth Nicene Canon and the Papacy,” in Sermons and Lectures (Philadelphia: H.L. Kilner & Co., 1890).

3.  Ibid. 191.

4. See A.L. Maycock, The Papacy (London: Ernest Benn, 1927), 5. And S. Herbert Scott, The Eastern Churches and the Papacy (London: Sheed & Ward, 1928), 78.

5. Similarly, the Executive Branch of the United States operates within clearly defined realms of authority. As Commander-in-Chief, the President commands unlimited authority over the military. However, in his capacity as Chief Executive, his power is limited to enforcing federal law and supervising executive agencies, confined within the bounds of governance. Thus, the President's jurisdiction varies from one capacity to the other, and you cannot infer his scope of jurisdiction in one capacity from the scope of jurisdiction in another.

6. The First Vatican Council (Chapter III, Paragraph 9) affirmed that the Pope holds “supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole church, and this not only in matters of faith and morals, but also in those which concern the discipline and government of the church dispersed throughout the whole world.” This power is “ordinary and immediate both over all and each of the churches and over all and each of the pastors and faithful.”

7. Loughlin, 192.

8. Leo Donald Davis, S.J., The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325- 787) (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1990), p. 56.

9. Fr. Thomas Crean, O.P., Vindicating the Filioque: The Church Fathers at the Council of Florence (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2023), 308.

10. Dom John Chapman, OSB, The First Eight General Councils and Papal Infallibility (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1906), 11.

11. This distinction, as we will see in later essays, applies equally well to Presiding over and Confirming councils.

12. Vatican Council II. Lumen Gentium: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. Solemnly promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on November 21, 1964, chapter III, paragraph 22.

13. J. Wilhelm, “General Councils,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04423f.htm.

14. Crean, Vindicating the Filioque, p. 314.

15. Chapman, The First Eight General Councils, 10.

16. Hergenrother, Joseph. Anti-Janus: An Historico-Theological Criticism of the Work Entitled 'The Pope and the Council'. Translated by J.B. Robertson, Esq., with an introduction by the translator giving a history of Gallicanism from the reign of Louis XIV to the present time. New York: The Catholic Publishing Society, 1870, p. 120.